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FAMILY LAW-VISITATION RIGHTS-KNOWN DONOR OF SPERM 
USED IN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AWARDED VISITATION 
RIGHTS-C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cum­
berland County Ct. 1977). 
Ms. C.C. and Mr. C.M. met in 1975. 1 Although the exact 
nature of their ensuing relationship is unclear, it can best be de­
scribed as casual, with only occasional dating. They neither lived 
together, nor engaged in any sexual relations. C.C., however, told 
C. M. that she wanted to give birth to a child conceived by artifi­
cial insemination. C. M. volunteered the use of his semen. The two 
then went to a doctor who referred them to a sperm bank. Although 
the sperm bank refused the use of its facilities, probably because 
C. C. was single, she learned from the attending physician of an 
artificial insemination procedure using a glass syringe and a bell 
jar. 2 After several months and numerous attempts, C.C. conceived 
a child using this method. 
Shortly after conception, C. C. and C. M.'s relationship termi­
nated. Moreover, after the child's birth, C.C. prevented C.M. 
from establishing any relationship with the child. C. C. paid all 
hospital, doctor, and delivery costs, and provided for the child's 
subsequent needs. 
Against the foregoing background, C.M. brought suit for visi­
tation rights. At the trial, C.M. testified that he and C.C. had 
dated each other and had contemplated marriage. When he agreed 
to provide his sperm in accordance with C.C.'s wishes, he believed 
their marriage was imminent. He contended that it was not until 
C.C. learned that she was pregnant that she terminated the rela­
tionship. C.M. also maintained that up to that point he had as­
sumed he would share parental responsibility for the child. 3 
C.C., on the other hand, denied ever contemplating marriage 
or any other serious relationship with C. M. In support ·of this con­
tention she argued that the relationship had always been a strictly 
1. The exact date of the commencement of their relationship is unclear from 
the opinion, but the court alludes to the fact that C.C. and C.M. had known each 
other for two years at the time of the trial. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 166, 377 
A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
2. C.M. remained in one room while C.C. attempted to inseminate herself in 
another with semen provided by C.M. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377 
A.2d 821, 821-22 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
3. Brief for Plaintiff at 1, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
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platonic one, that conception was accomplished through the use of 
artincial insemination, and that she had paid for all delivery and 
subsequent living expenses for the child. 4 She also claimed that her 
original purpose in discussing the idea of artincial insemination 
with C. M. was to inquire whether she should ask one of his friends 
to supply the sperm. 5 Based on this conflicting testimony, the 
court found for C. M., holding that a known donor of semen used 
by an unmarried woman to artincially inseminate herself was the 
natural father of the child and, as such, was entitled to visitation 
rights. The court's decision has not been appealed. 
For the purposes of this discussion, there are two types of 
artincial insemination. 6 The classmcations relate to the supplier of 
the sperm. Artincial Insemination Husband, or AIH, is the intro­
duction of the husband's sperm into the wife. It is used where 
normal fertilization by sexual intercourse is impossible. Artincial 
Insemination Donor, AID, is the insemination of a married woman 
by the sperm of a third party donor. In AID cases, the predomi­
nate legal issue is whether the husband or the donor is the father. 
No such issue exists in AIH cases because the husband is the 
donor. In fact, AIH rarely poses any legal problems because the 
child is viewed as the biological offspring of both parents. 7 
Most legal problems in AID cases8 arise when one parent 
4. Brief for Defendant at 3-4, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977). At the time of trial, the child was over a year old and 
had been cared for solely by C.C. Id. at 4. Plaintiff suggested that C.C. was living 
with a girl friend and that they intended to raise the child together_ Brief for Plain­
tiff, supra note 2, at 6. The court's opinion, however, is silent on this point. 
S. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377 A.2d 821, 821 (Cumberland 
County Ct. 1977). Defendant argued that she seriously considered using B. as the 
donor of the sperm and that it was only after discussing it with C.M. that she 
changed her mind and decided to use him. Brief for Defendant, supra note 4, at 8. 
6. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 
(Sur. Ct. 1973). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 33-36 
infra. 
7. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 
(Sur. Ct. 1973). The court in Anonymous used the phrase "natural child" when de­
scribing the AIH procedure. Id. at 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 431. The term is ill-advised 
in the artificial insemination context because it connotes legal implications that tend 
to be conclusory. Indeed, defendant argued that artificial insemination by definition 
is directly opposed to the concept of "natural." Brief for Defendant, supra note 4, at 
2-3. 
8. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 
(Sur. Ct. 1973). The AID procedure may be performed with the consent of the hus­
band (consensual) or without it (nonconsensual). The few reported cases involving 
consensual AID include: People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 7 (1968); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99,345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. 
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questions the legitimacy of an AID child in a divorce or support 
action. 9 In the typical AID setting couples go to a sperm bank 
where a doctor selects the donor. Donors are often medical stu­
dents whose physical characteristics resemble those of the husband. 
The doctor usually selects, as a donor, a married man who is free 
from congenital defects and has at least one normal child. Total 
anonymity prevails. 10 
The court in the instant case was presented with a unique fac­
tual situation that matched neither the AID nor the AIH pattern. 
Because the donee was a single woman, and the donor was not an 
anonymous third party, the C.C. facts differ from an AID pattern. 
If the instant case was decided on an AID theory, a serious ques­
tion would arise about the legitimacy of the child. Under an AID 
theory C. M. would be viewed as a volunteer with no connection to 
either C.C. or the child, hence the child would be without a father 
and by definition, illegitimate. If, on the other hand, the case was 
decided on an AIH theory, the child would be legitimate, but the 
court would be faced with the absence of a "marriage" con­
templated by the AIH theory. 
The court attempted to circumvent this impasse by drawing a 
parallel between the manner of conception in the instant case and 
conception by intercourse. It observed that, in this case, a woman 
chose to have a baby and a man chose to provide -the needed 
sperm. They were not married to each other and selected a 
method for transmitting sperm other than by sexual intercourse. 
The court, in C. M. v. C. C. ,11 noted that if conception took place 
Ct. 1973); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Peo­
ple ex rei. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958); 
Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Of these, only 
two, Dennett and Strnad, deal with the visitation rights of the father. While the court 
in C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977), 
did examine Strnad, it omitted Dennett altogether. For an analysis of both cases, see 
text accompanying notes 21-27 infra. There are no reported cases on nonconsernmal 
AID. 
9. The court in Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 
1948), has accepted the argument that an AID child is not technically of the hus­
band's blood, but it allowed visitation rights. 
10. A. ROSENFELD, THE SECOND GENESIS 153-54 (1969). The physician has a 
great deal of responsibility in artificial insemination cases. Elaborate release or con­
sent forms must be filled out and signed by the parties. 
C.C. was turned away from the sperm bank. Not only were they not married, but 
the policy of anonymity of the donor would have been violated as well. Accord, 
Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WOMEN LAw. J. 57 (1947). 
11. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 165,377 A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
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by intercourse there would be no question that the 'donor' would 
be the father. The court then framed the issue as whether C.M. 
was any less a father because he provided the semen by a method 
different from that normally used. 12 In addressing the issue of 
fatherhood, the court returned to the question whether, under the 
C.C. facts, th~ insemination was of the AID or AIR type. It rea­
soned that C.C. was "more analogous" to the AIR situation. 
Once it had drawn this conclusion, the court was forced to cast 
C. M. in the AIR definitional requirement of husband. Drawing on 
principles developed from its examination of AID cases, the C. C. 
court found an obligation for support based upon an analogy to a 
situation where a husband had consented to the artificial insemina­
tion of his wife by a third party donor.13 This consent created a 
relationship between the husband and the child that could not be 
"assumed and disclaimed at will. "14 Rather, the "husband" must be 
the "father" of the children for whom he is directly responsible. 
After establishing C. M.'s moral and legal responsibility for the 
child, the court went on to announce the policy that a child should 
be "provided with a father as well as a mother. "15 It supported its 
policy decision by finding that it was in the best interests of the 
child to have two parents if possible. 16 Finally, the court noted that 
12. [d. The statement of the issue is critical in C.C. because once couched in 
these tenns, the resolution is almost preordained. 
13. 152 N.J. Super. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824 (citing Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 
2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) and People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 
284, 437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1968)). For a detailed examination of 
these cases, see text accompanying notes 28 through 42 infra. 
14. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 
11 (1968). 
15. 152 N.J. Super. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824. The court set no guidelines for the 
implementation of such a policy in the area of artificial insemination, nor did it rec­
ognize any exceptions to its rather broad statement. It would be interesting to see 
how such a policy would be viewed if, for example, a widow who had undergone the 
AID procedure with the consent of her husband who died before conception, were 
to discover that X, a medical student, was the donor of the semen used for her child's 
conception. Using the C.C. court's analysis and policy considerations, if X sued for 
visitation rights he would stand a good chance of success. There would be a known 
donor who was able and willing to undertake responsibility for a child he helped 
conceive. He would also provide the "second parent" that the court sees as the right 
of every child. The argument should undoubtedly be made that since, at the time of 
the donation, neither the medical student nor the mother had intended him to be the 
father of the child, he should not later be allowed to assert the rights of a parent. 
This note contends that the focus on the intent and conduct of both parties is the 
proper one. See text accompanying note 60 infra. 
16. 152 N.J. Super. at 167, 377 A.2d at 825. For a discussion of the best in­
terests ofthe child standard, see text accompanying notes 43-50 infra. 
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the donor was not anonymous, but rather was someone C.C. had 
been acquainted with for at least two years.17 It also emphasized 
that C. M. was not only in a good position to assume the respon­
sibilities of fatherhood, he was also willing to do SO.18 
The e. e. court's analysis is subject to criticism because the 
court attempted to force this case into a traditional mold by draw­
ing parallels to analyses in other artificial insemination cases with­
out adequately examining the factual context in which the cases 
took place. It missed the import of the relationship between the 
parties. Instead, the court opted for whatever prior case law factu­
ally approached e. e. without considering that those precedents 
may be of little value where traditional relationships and motiva­
tions are absent. 
e. e. was unique because it could not be properly cast as 
either an AID or AIR case. It differed from the AIR situation be­
cause there was neither a husband nor was there a serious, on­
going relationship which could be constructively viewed as a mar­
riage. AID cases could not be profitably compared because there 
was no third party donor; C.M. was known to C.C. and willingly 
donated the sperm with knowledge of its intended use. 
C.C.'s knowledge of the donor was a central element in the 
court's decision to allow C. M. visitation rights to the child. The 
court reasoned that in the usual AID19 situation, the donor, by 
giving his semen anonymously, impliedly disclaims any responsibil­
ity for its use. It then observed that C.C. had received the semen 
from a friend whom she had known for two years. In reaching its 
conclusion that the e. e. facts were more analogous to the AIR 
cases, the court further observed that had the couple been mar­
ried, C.M. would be the father, or if the child had been conceived 
by intercourse, C. M. would be the father, whether married or not. 
It then held that "if an unmarried woman conceives a child through 
artificial insemination from semen from a known man, that man 
cannot be considered any less a father because he is not married to 
the woman. "20 
In addition to the presence of a known donor, the e. e. court 
17. See note 1 supra. 
18. 152 N.J. Super. at 167-68, 377 A.2d at 825. Since C.M. was a teacher, the 
court felt that he was able to contribute to both the educational and financial support 
of the child. ld. 
19. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra for a discussion of the usual AID 
procedures. 
20. 152 N.J. Super. at 163,377 A.2d at 824. 
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relied on several artificial insemination cases and the abstract prin­
ciple that it is in the best interests of a child to have two parents. 
A brief examination of those cases will reveal the Significant factual 
distinctions between C. C. and the earlier artificial insemination 
cases that render the earlier cases inapplicable to C. C. 
Two of the cases cited in C. C. deal with visitation rights of the 
father after a valid divorce decree. In Strnad v. Strnad,21 plaintiff 
wife brought an action against her husband seeking to terminate his 
visitation rights with their minor child. The wife had been artifi­
cially inseminated by a third party donor with the husband's con­
sent during their marriage. The court was not persuaded by the 
wife's claim that defendant husband was an unfit guardian, finding 
instead that the best interests of the child called for the visits. 22 
The court did not directly address the issue of whether the hus­
band was the father of the AID child, holding instead that he had 
potentially or semi-adopted the child. From this it reasoned that 
the husband was entitled to the same rights as those normally 
granted a foster parent who had formally adopted a child. 23 
A slightly different issue was examined in People ex rei. Aba­
jian v. Dennett, 24 where a man brought an action against his wife 
to enforce custody arrangements provided for in their separation 
agreement. She claimed that since both of their children were born 
as a result of artificial insemination, plaintiff was not the father of 
the children, and therefore should not be allowed any custody or 
visitation rights. 25 The court, in holding for the plaintiff, dissal­
lowed the defendant's artificial insemination claim on the ground 
that the defendant, in agreeing to the language of the divorce de­
cree, furnished "sufficient legal basis to estop the assertion of any 
contrary claim."26 Moreover, to allow the defendant's claim would 
be, according to the court, contrary to the best interests of the 
children. A decision for the defendant would create illegitimacy, a 
result which the court would not allow as "parens patriae" for the 
children. 
21. 190 Misc. 786,78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
22. [d. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391. 
23. [d. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. 
24. 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
25. Plaintiff also challenged the general fitness of his ex-wife to retain custody 
of the children. [d. at 262-63, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 182. On this issue the court held that 
the plaintiff's evidence had not shown a sufficient change of circumstances in the 
relationship between his ex-wife and the children to warrant a modification of the 
separation agreement. [d. at 265, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 184. 
26. [d. at 263, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 182. 
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Direct comparison of Strnad and Dennett with C. C. is not in­
structive. Strnad and Dennett dealt with married couples who used 
AID procedures with the knowledge and consent of both parties. 
In both cases the children knew their parents and had lived with 
them as a family for some period of time. These cases may be 
instructive, however, because they point out the factors courts 
examine when attempting to fashion a remedy where judicial or 
legislative guidance is lacking. In Strnad, the court looked to the 
interaction of the child with the defendant and determined that the 
relationship was akin to adoption. 27 Dennett is particularly en­
lightening in this vein because it examined the actions of both par­
ties, estopping one from claiming a construction of the facts that 
would have been clearly inconsistent with earlier behavior. In both 
cases, then, the courts emphasized the actions of the parties and 
the nature of their relationship. 
At least one court has held that an AID child is illegitimate, 
but found the father's duty to support on another theory. In 
Gursky v. Gursky, 28 a husband brought an action for annulment 
and separation. 29 The evidence presented at trial indicated that 
shortly after their marriage, the Gurskys discovered that they 
would not be able to bear children. After seeking medical advice, 
the couple decided that the wife would be artificially inseminated 
by a third party donor. Further evidence indicated that both par­
ties signed consent forms for the procedure. In addition, the hus­
band promised to pay for all medical expenses. After the child was 
born, the birth certificate listed the plaintiff as the father and de­
fendant as the mother of the child. 
The Gursky court found that a child conceived by the AID 
procedure was not the legitimate issue of the husband. 30 However, 
he could be held responsible for the support of an AID child under 
a theory of implied contract and equitable estoppel. 31 Under this 
theory, the court determines if a legal agreement can be inferred 
27. The OpinIOn omits the specific facts of defendant's interaction with his 
child. In arriving at its opinion the court also assumed that the AID procedure was 
done with the consent of the husband. 190 Misc. at 788,78 N.Y.S.2d at 392. 
28. 39 Misc. 2d 1083,242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
29. Plaintiff specifically pleaded for an annulment based upon a failure of con­
summation of the marriage, and for separation on the ground of abandonment and 
cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at 1084, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08. 
30. Id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411. 
31. Id. The court cited two New York cases as support for its theory, Renner v. 
John T. Stanley Co., 136 Misc. 492, 493, 240 N.Y.S. 148, 149 (1930), and Wells v. 
Mann, 45 N.Y. 327 (1871). 
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from the facts and circumstances of the case even though no formal 
agreement was made by the parties. If the court finds such an 
agreement, then the breaching party will be held liable. After ex­
amining the evidence, the court held that there was an implied 
contract between plaintiff and defendant to conceive the child, and 
the husband was estopped from denying his obligation to support 
the child. 32 
The conduct of the parties was also closely scrutinized in In re 
Adoption of Anonymous33 where the petitioner was attempting to 
adopt his wife's child from her first marriage. The child had been 
conceived by consensual AID during her first marriage. The ex­
husband was listed as the father of the child on the birth certifi­
cate. After the divorce he was allowed visitation rights and com­
plied with all the support conditions of the decree. H~ refused, 
however I to consent34 to the stepfather's adoption of the child. The 
petitioner argued that such consent was not required because the 
first husband was not the natural father of the child. 
The court held that "a child born of consensual AID during a 
valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and 
privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. "35 It 
grounded its opinion on a strong statutory policy in favor of legiti­
macy, finding that "it would seem absurd to hold illegitimate a 
child born during a valid marriage, of parents desiring but unable 
to conceive a child, and both consenting and agreeing to the im­
pregnation of the mother by a carefully and medically selected 
anonymous donor. "36 
32. 39 Misc. 2d at 1088-89,242 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12. 
33. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973). 
34. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § III (McKinney 1977). Consent is required under 
subsection 1 of the statute: 
1. Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption 
shall be required as follows: 
(a) Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge 
or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent; 
(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child 
born in wedlock; 
(c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wed­
lock; 
(d) Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the 
adoptive child. 
35. 74 Misc. 2d at 105, 345 N.Y.S. 2d at 435-36. In so holding the court ex­
pressly overruled the Gursky decision that had held such a child to be illegitimate. 
ld. at 104, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 434. 
36. ld. at 104-05, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435. 
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Perhaps the most frequently cited artificial insemination case is 
People v. Sorensen. 37 Sorensen involved a criminal prosecution 
against a husband for failure to support a minor child conceived 
through consensual AID and born during his marriage. 38 Defen­
dant and his wife had agreed to use the AID procedure after fifteen 
years of marriage. They consulted a physician and signed an 
agreement regarding the procedures to be used. The defendant 
also signed a consent form permitting his wife to undergo the pro­
cedure. She subsequently became pregnant and bore a child. The 
defendant lived with his wife and child for about four years during 
which time he treated the child as his own and represented to 
friends that he was the child's father. The couple separated when 
the child was four years old. After the separation, Mrs. Sorensen 
requested no support payments for the child. 
Two years later, Mrs. Sorensen became unable to work due to 
illness and applied for and received public assistance from the 
County of Sonoma, California. The defendant made no support 
payments to the child although a demand for support was made by 
the district attorney.39 The court framed the issue as whether the 
husband of a woman who had submitted to an AID procedure with 
his consent was guilty of failing to support the child. It held that 
Sorensen was the father of the child and that his "conduct carries 
with it an obligation for support."40 In arriving at its conclusion, 
the court found that an AID child did not have a "natural father" 
since the anonymous donor was "no more responsible for the use 
made of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney. "41 It 
sought, instead, to determine who was the lawful father. 
The court ruled that the defendant was the lawful father of the 
child. It held that a husband who consented to an AID procedure 
must bear "the legal responsibilities for fatherhood."42 
37. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). 
38. Suit was brought by the welfare authorities pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE 
~ 270 (West Supp. 1978). 
39. The demand was made pursuant to the California Penal Code. See id. 
40. Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The court construed the word 
"father" in the statute to include a husband who chooses to use the semen of a third 
party donor to inseminate his wife for the purposes of conceiving a child. Id. at 286, 
437 P.2d at 499-500,66 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11. This finding was grounded on the court's 
premise that "[o]ne who consents to the production of a child cannot create a tem­
porary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but the arrangement must be 
of such character as to impose an obligation of supporting those for whose existence 
he is directly responsible." Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499,66 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
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In each of the cases discussed thus far, Strnad, Dennett, 
Gursky, Anonymous, and Sorensen, the court relied on one or 
more of the following elements in finding a "father" for the child: 
evidence of a marriage, written evidence of the parties' intent at 
the time of insemination, evidence that the child had lived or in­
teracted with both parents, or evidence of conduct forming the 
basis for an implied contract or equitable estoppel. C.C. and C.M. 
were not married nor were they seriously involved beyond a casual 
dating relationship over a two year period. Since the insemination 
procedure was not accomplished at a sperm bank or under the 
auspices of a doctor, there was no documentary evidence to be 
examined. The child, who at the time of the trial was one year old, 
had never met C. M. and could not, therefore, have cultivated the 
psychological and emotional relationship with C. M. that the chil­
dren in all the preceding artificial insemination cases had devel­
oped with their fathers. Perhaps realizing the lack of appropriate 
factual elements to justify treating C.M. as a lawful father, the C.C. 
court invoked the best interests of the child test to reach what it 
felt was a desirable result. 
The New Jersey courts traditionally use the best interests of 
the child test, as formulated in Baker v. Baker,43 to evaluate a pa­
rent's visitation right. In Baker, the question before the court in­
volved access by a father to his illegitimate child who was in the 
mother's custody. The court held that the best interests of the 
child called for visits by the father unless the mother could show 
that the visits would be harmful. 44 In 1971, R. v. F.45 reaffirmed 
this test by holding that the father of an illegitimate child possessed 
visitation rights without the express or implied consent of the 
mother. 
In allowing the visitation rights, the court was strongly per­
suaded by the following facts: the couple had lived together as 
husband and wife for approximately one year before the child was 
born, and had engaged in a private, unlicensed ritual of marriage; 
the couple wore wedding rings and lived together as a family; the 
father demonstrated strong interest in and actively cared for the 
child while the "family" remained together; and finally, the wife 
43. 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 A. 816 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1913). The court equated 
the visitation rights issue to that of custody which uses the same standard. ld. 
44. ld. at 139, 85 A. at 816. 
45. 113 N.J. Super. 396,273 A.2d 808 (1971). 
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left her husband because she wanted to make a clean start with her 
child. 46 
A close reading of R. v. F. reveals the C.C. court's concern 
with characterizing C.M. as the "natural father" of the child. New 
Jersey law mandates that the mother of an illegitimate child shall 
have custody and control of the child and the putative father shall 
have no access to the child without the mother's consent. 47 The R. 
v. F. court found that the "admitted father who showed an active 
interest in the child's welfare should not be classified as a 'putative' 
father. "48 
Similarly, the C.C. court found a factual basis for C.M.'s as­
serted paternity from a casual dating relationship and C. M.'s 
statement that he "fully intended to assume the responsibilities of 
parenthood."49 There was, however, no examination of C.C.'s in­
tent, the significance of the unusual fact situation, or the possible 
adverse impact which C.M.'s visits could have on the child. Rather 
than carefully examining the possible adverse impact of allowing 
visitation, the court simply decided that "[i]t is in a child's best 
interests to have two parents whenever possible."50 
The C. C. court's "best interest" approach was coupled with its 
underlying conviction that the biological parents-that is, the pro­
viders of the sperm and egg-have a strong, instinctive, and posi­
tive tie to the child regardless of the circumstances. 51 Others ar­
46. Id. at 399-400, 273 A.2d at BI0. 
47. The statute provides: 
The mother of an illegitimate child, whether married or single, shall 
have the exclusive right to its custody and control and the putative father of 
such child shall have no right of custody, control or access to such child 
without the mother's consent. If, however, it is proved that the mother is 
unfit to have the custody and control of such child, the Superior Court or 
any other court which may have jurisdiction in the premises may make any 
order touching the custody or control of such child which might heretofore 
have been made. 
This section is intended to be declaratory of the existing law upon this 
subject and it shall, under no circumstances, be construed as an implication 
that the rights of such a mother have hitherto been less than as herein above 
defined. 
Amended by L.1953, c. 9, p. 80 § 26. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-1 (West 1976). 
4B. 113 N.J. Super. at 407, 273 A.2d at B14. The court also found that the issue 
of fatherhood would not have to be determined through a formal bastardy proceed­
ing, but could be accomplished by voluntary admission. Id. at 40B, 273 A.2d at B14­
15. 
49. 152 N.J. Super. at 167,377 A.2d at B24. 
50. Id. at 167, 377 A.2d at B25. 
51. This would appear to be the view taken by some in the field of family law. 
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gue, however, that the physical realities of conception and birth 
are not the direct cause of the child's emotional attachment. 
Rather, they are the result of "day-to-day attention to his needs for 
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. "52 
The latter view stresses the psychological relationship between pa­
rent and child rather than the biological relationship. "An absent 
biological parent will remain or tend to become a stranger."53 
The New York Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue 
in Bennet v. Jeffreys, 54 where the natural mother petitioned to ob­
tain custody of her child from its guardian after a prolonged separa­
tion. In remanding the case, the court outlined the pertinent con­
siderations of the best interests test as: the length of custody of the 
non-parent custodian, testimony of a psychologist that returning to 
the mother would be "very traumatic for the child," the mother's 
current fitness, "the circumstances and environment of the custo­
dian, the stability of her household, her inability to adopt, her age, 
and any other circumstances bearing upon the fitness or adequacy 
of a child's custodian over the whole period of childhood. . . . "55 
This test as applied in Jeffreys would allow a parent the "right" to 
rear his or her child56 unless "extraordinary circumstances" dictate 
that the best interests of the child warrant different treatment. 57 
The unique fact situation in C.C. militates toward the kind of 
test applied in Jeffreys. The child in Jeffreys had never known its 
"father" and at the time of the appeal, it was well over a year old. 
Similarly, in C.C., the child had never known its "father" while 
the mother had adequately provided for the child, and had ap-
Some commentators, however, have found this position somewhat anomalous in light 
of the many cases of infanticide, infant-battery, child neglect, abuse, and abandon­
ment. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A.J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 17 (1973). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. The authors emphasize that the role of the psychological parent could 
be filled by any adult who has day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared 
experiences with the child. But it could never be done by an "absent, inactive adult, 
whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be." Id. at 19. 
54. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976). The mother had 
given up her child, now an eight-year-old girl, shortly after birth, to a fonner school­
mate of the child's grandmother. Id. at 544,356 N.E.2d at 280,387 N.Y.S.2d at 823. 
55. Id. at 552, 356 N.E.2d at 285,387 N.Y.S.2d at 828. 
56. The child would have the concomitant right to be reared by the parent. Id. 
at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824. 
57. This rule implicitly recognizes the great care courts must take in utilizing 
their parens patriae power. Under current constitutional principles, courts could not 
displace parents "except for grievous cause or necessity." Id. See generally Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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parently bestowed upon it all the love and care any parent would. 
The court should have considered the possible detrimental impact 
that the intrusion of C. M. would have upon the child. The result of 
not making the child illegitimate is a laudable one, but it should 
not be achieved at the expense of the child's psychological well~ 
being. Rather than basing its decision on the premise that a child 
should have two parents whenever possible, the court should have 
weighed the potential social and emotional harm in the case against 
the intangible benefit of exposing the child to its "biological" 
father. 58 
The C. C. decision, then, rests on three grounds: the lack of an 
anonymous donor which allowed the court to treat the case as an 
AIH situati~n; several earlier cases which held that a man who con~ 
sents to artificial insemination while in a family setting has the 
rights and duties of a father; and finally, the court's notion that it is 
in the best interests of a child to have two parents. These grounds, 
taken either separately or together, do not provide an entirely 
satisfactory basis for the decision. 
The facts of C.C. clearly indicate that C.C. specifically in­
tended nothing more than a casual relationship with C.M. There 
was never any sexual relationship between the two, nor did they 
ever live together as friends or roommates. No conduct by either 
party indicated an awareness or expectation of anything but a 
casual relationship. Yet disregarding overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, the court impliedly created a stronger relationship for the 
benefit of the child. Further, even after C.C. decided to use C.M. 
as the donor, there was never a hint of anything personal or inti­
mate between them. The procedure itself was conducted in a very 
mechanical and impersonal manner. The method used to impreg­
nate C.C. should have put C.M. on notice that C.C. viewed him 
solely as a volunteer. 59 
58. The court seems to assume, without specifically stating, that a child needs a 
male parent to be raised properly. There was some evidence that C.C. was living 
with a girl friend and that they intended to raise the child together. Brief for Plain­
tiff, supra note 4, at 6. Plaintiff argued that it would be harmful for a male child to be 
raised "without the knowledge and benefit of a father figure." Id. He further argued 
that the defendant had not demonstrated that a father's entrance into the child's life 
at this point would have any harmful impact on the child. Id. If the court accepted 
this argument, it made an error in not substantiating it with at least some empirical 
evidence. This would seem especially true because many single parents are cur­
rently adopting children. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 51, at 62. 
59. This argument was made by the defendant but discounted by the court 
which found that plaintiff had not waived his parental rights. Brief for Defendant, 
supra note 4, at 3-4. 
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The question of intent is curiously absent from the C. C. opin­
ion, with the exception of the court's finding that C. M. "fully in­
tended to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. "60 The court 
did not examine or discuss what C.C.'s intent may have been, nor 
does the court seem concerned that the facts do not logically sub­
stantiate C. M.'s assertion of marital intent. 
The major flaws in the C. C. court's analysis are its rigid 
adherence to. the traditional conviction that every child should have 
a father, and its unwillingness to search beyond the field of family 
law for a possible solution to the question before it. The court 
failed to realize that novel fact situations sometimes call for novel 
approaches. Rather than confine itself to family law principles, the 
court should have explored two areas of contract law, implied 
contract-equitable estoppel and express contract. 
The implied contract-equitable estoppel approach had already 
been used by the Gursky court and can be readily adapted to the 
C.C. fact situation. The inquiry should focus on the conduct and 
declarations of both parties. If the plaintiff had been led to believe 
that he was to be the father of the child and the husband of C.C., 
and that was his motivation for agreeing to the procedure, then 
C.C. would be estopped from asserting a contrary argument. If, on 
the other hand, there was no such evidence, C. M. would be pre­
cluded from asserting any rights to the child. The burden of proof 
should be on plaintiff since he is the one seeking to change the 
status quo. 
A second approach would require an express contract. Absent 
an express contract, the court would refuse to enforce an asserted 
right of access to the child. While this solution may seem some­
what draconian in the family law setting, in a case such as C.C., 
the nature of the conception itself should put the parties on notice 
that some kind of formal agreement is advisable. In addition to 
realistically giving effect to the parties' intent, this approach may 
also prompt needed legislative action. 
The C. C. court's failure to confront the full range of implica­
tions generated by the instant fact situation illustrates the danger of 
some courts' tendencies to view a case solely as a contract, tort, or 
family law problem. Once a case has been labelled, many courts 
limit their analysis to one category, excluding any theories or ap­
proaches not within the traditional field. The C. C. result illustrates 
the problem well. The court recognized the uniqueness of the case, 
60. 162 N.J. Super. at 163,377 A.2d at 824. 
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but refused to look beyond family law rubric. Instead, it settled for 
an analogy within the artificial insemination context that in many 
respects is unsatisfactory. The law need not and should not be read 
so restrictively. Employing an express or implied contract-equi­
table estoppel approach may be extremely helpful in such novel 
areas as artificial insemination. These approaches focus on the facts 
of the individual case, and militate against the kind of loose com­
parisons engaged in by the c. c. court. This kind of judicial pio­
neering would be especially useful in light of the increasing num­
ber of cases for which there is no legal precedent or legislative 
guidelines for courts to follow. As in C.C., these cases are often 
prompted by scientific advancement not anticipated by the law. 
"There is always a painful lag before the mechanisms and attitudes 
of society, including the law, catch up with the new reality that 
science has wrought. "61 Courts, by responding to novel problems 
with flexible approaches, can minimize this lag between the law 
and technological reality. 
Daniel Lennon Saxe 
61. A. ROSENFELD, supra note 10, at 6. 
